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Abstract 
In this paper I argue that political-economy considerations –and in particular the identity of the 
reformers- are central to understanding the Argentine crisis.  
During the 90´s the main political parties remained attached to populism, and no strong party 
emerged at the center of the political spectrum. This had two effects in the reform process. First, 
it severely deteriorated it (efficiency, corruption), reducing the support of the population. Second, 
when a series of shocks hit the economy the anti-reform camp tried to undo most reforms, and 
thus convey a message to the population about the “right” model of the world.  
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I.  Introduction 
“Economists must not only know their economic models, but also 
understand politics, interests, conflicts, passions – the essence of 
collective life. For a brief period of time you could make changes 
by decree; but to let them persist, you have to build coalitions 
around them. You have to be a politician.” 
Alejandro Foxley, Chilean Minister of Finance (quoted in Drazen, 
2000) 
 
The gloomiest Tango would be insufficient to describe the situation of Argentina: the 
country was left in shambles shortly after being the darling of Washington and Wall 
Street. Following years of impressive growth and stability, Argentina is experiencing its 
biggest economic depression ever recorded in peacetime.   
A number of papers and media articles have since tried to explain the causes of the crisis 
and its severity. These papers center their analysis on the fiscal deficit, the currency 
board, and the functioning of international financial markets. The argument of this paper 
is that while many of the approaches presented so far have some merit in explaining the 
origins and the severity of the crisis, they are insufficient –if not misguided-, and 
political-economy considerations are central to understanding the unfolding of events. In 
particular, I argue that the identity of the reformers (and their successors) lies at the heart 
of the Argentine crisis. In several Emerging Market Countries (EMC), reforms were 
initiated not by free-marketers but by unlikely characters such as former populists and 
leftists (see Williamson and Haggard, 1994 and Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). In 
Argentina, the hyperinflation opened a window for reforms, and these were adopted by 
President Menem, from the populist Peronist party, with the help of a group of competent 
technocrats lead by Minister Cavallo. 
Even though their populist origins made possible the launch of an impressive set of (first-
generation) reforms, they left substantial “illiberal” enclaves,
1 they implemented them in 
an efficient and often corrupted way, and they did not reform any politico-institutional 
rules and practices. All this worked against the reform process, as the benefits of reforms 
                                                 
1 See Bambaci, Saront and Tommasi, 2002. Their main point is that the fundamental reforms executed were 
politically viable thanks to the maintenance of these “illiberal enclaves”.   2
did not reach the population at large, and corruption practices were seen as part of the 
same “package” as reforms.  
Neither the Peronist nor the Radical party (the main opposition party by then and the one 
that succeeded Menem in 1999) changed during the reform process, and most of their 
ranks remained convinced of the old protectionist and state-intervention policies. The 
coalitional nature of the main parties, along with the fact that Deputies are elected in 
provincial districts made that, amazingly, those opposing reforms received the lion share 
of recognition among voters in the succeeding legislative elections. Moreover, the 
implicit alliance between the Peronists and the political center, which provided 
ideological support and the technocrats, avoided the emergence of a strong pro-business 
political party during the initial years of the Convertibility.
2 
Once the external shocks stared to hit the economy, the population could not discern 
whether their ills were due to the new model (of minimal state intervention) or due to the 
shocks. The anti-reform camp tried to undo the reforms instead of introducing new 
measures to cope with the shocks, to convey the population a signal of the “right” model 
according to their view. This was because the remaining reforms touched the limits of 
ideology and the nerve of the interests that they represented (some  provinces, labor 
unions, protected industries, etc.). They could not have reverted the reforms if these had 
been executed efficiently, but the setback in the reform process since 1996, the extended 
corruption in the political system, and the external shocks received deteriorated the 
sustainability basis of the reform process in Argentina. 
To make matters worse, as the anti-reform camp narrowed the scope of reforms, the 
reforming technocrats –with the acknowledgment of the IMF- tried to increased taxes or 
slashed (structural) expenditures to reduce the fiscal deficit. These measures outraged the 
population, as they were contemporaneous with a sense of extended corruption and self-
serving politicians, and an inefficient public sector.  
                                                 
2 A similar view was expressed by Alberto Ades (Goldman Sachs) at the NBER conference on Exchange 
Rate’s Crises on Emerging Markets Countries held in Boston on July 17, 2002.   3
The growing dissatisfaction with the political parties led more than 40 percent of the 
voters to abstain or to nullify their votes in the legislative elections held in October 2001. 
Among those who cast positive votes, the anti-reform camp won hands over, and they 
quickly and mistakenly interpreted the election results as a vote against the model (of 
minimal state intervention). Shortly after, organized riots in the Province of Buenos Aires 
put an end to De la Rúa’s government. Since then, the executive and legislative powers 
have tried to undo most of the reforms established in the 90s, and they repeatedly blamed 
the “model” (of minimal state intervention) of the ills the population was suffering.
3 
To my knowledge, the only paper that makes a somewhat similar argument to mine is 
that of Bambaci et al. (2002), but their main objective is to make a case that the reforms 
executed were politically viable thanks to the maintenance of some “illiberal enclaves”. 
The argument then goes that the lack of complementary reforms impeded the possibility 
of adjusting within the Convertibility regime, and that the Argentine polity was unable to 
reach the intertemporal political agreements to provide credible agreements to the 
currency board (see Galiani, Heymann and Tommasi, 2002, and Tommasi, 2002). But the 
argument here is that it was not a matter of inability, but one of unwillingness of the anti-
reform camp. They preferred a failure of the reform process, to defend their interests and 
to provide the public a signal of the “right” model of the world according to their view. 
The ironic part is that the anti-reform camp was made stronger due to the recognition of 
the voters to the parties that they belonged to, and that initiated and tried to continue with 
the reform process. 
In what follows, I try to build a good case for the appreciation that political-economy 
considerations are key to understand the events in Argentina. In Section II I discuss the 
merits of alternative explanations of the crisis. In Section III I argue that the 
Convertibility was not thought simply as a monetary policy, but was a way to stop a long-
standing distributional conflict, and an interlocked part of a supply-side policy. In Section 
IV I develop our case in favor of a political-economy view of the crisis. Section V draws 
some policy lessons.  
                                                 
3 The show included an applauded repudiation of the sovereign debt in Congress.   4
II. Alternative Explanations of the Crisis 
Although most of the papers and policy notes written so far point out that several 
problems coexisted at the time of the crisis, one can characterize them in terms of the 
balance of payments crisis literature as belonging to two different strands.  
One strand emphasizes the inconsistency between the fixed exchange rate and the fiscal 
policy pursued, much in the spirit of “first generation” models of currency crises. Some 
of these papers or media articles point directly to the inconsistency between fiscal 
policies and the peg, like Feldstein (2002) and Krueger (2002), while others stress one of 
the two aspects. Mussa (2002) and Schuler (2002), for instance, emphasize the fiscal 
deficit and unsustainable debt dynamics, the second one being an advocate of fixed 
exchange rates. Other authors point their fingers mostly to the currency board, with 
alternative arguments. De la Torre et al. (2002) argue that the relationship between the 
currency board and the financial system is essential to understanding the crisis, given that 
the high exposure of the banking system to fluctuations in the real exchange rate made 
them prone to runs. Edwards (2002) arguments that under super-fixed exchange rates 
overvaluation is very difficult to resolve. For Hausmann and Velasco (2002), the 
interaction of a grossly misaligned real exchange rate and the country’s capacity to 
borrow is at the center of the crisis.  
The other strand of papers has a “second generation” (models of currency crises) flavor, 
in the sense that fundamentals per se were not the key drivers of the crisis. In Calvo et al. 
(2002), “sudden stops” to capital inflows played an important role, while problems in 
some fundamentals, namely the closedness of the economy and the penchant for 
dollarization, magnified the effects. According to Galiani et al. (2002), sizable external 
shocks generated large-scale revisions of the agents´ perceptions of permanent income, 
and the system was not prepared to handle the necessary adjustment.  
II.1. The Fiscal Debate 
It is hard if not impossible to argue against the notion that the fiscal deficit was the 
immediate cause of the crisis. Simply put, if Argentina’s public sector did not have big 
external borrowing requirements during the period 1999-2001, there would have been no 
crisis.   5
A close inspection of the numbers would reveal, however, that the excess expenditures 
were concentrated in the provincial level, and that at the federal level there was no feast 
during the 90s. There were, however, clear problems in the efficiency of spending at all 
government levels, a matter that is discussed in Section IV.B. In addition, it is true that 
in countries in which subnational governments have autonomy to borrow, it is unlikely 
that central governments can commit not to bail them out in times of trouble.  
Table 1.B presents some key fiscal indicators. In favor of the argument that fiscal 
accounts were under control in the federal government, note that: 
1.  After recording surpluses in 1992 and 1993, federal fiscal deficits were very low 
as percentage of GDP throughout the period (lines 4.3 and 4.4.).  
2.  The public debt was among the lowest in the Emerging Markets (see line 4.7 and 
Ades and Buscaglia, 1999). Moreover, active debt management extended the 
average maturity of the debt, which was among the highest in Emerging Markets, 
reducing liquidity risk.
4 
3.  Non-entitlement expenditures (wages and goods and services) rose from 1990 to 
1994 due to an increase of wages from very low levels, remained almost flat from 
1995 to 1999, and later decreased (see lines 4.2.1 and 4.2.2).  
4.  The transformation of the social security from a pay–as–you-go system to a fully 
funded one made the government to loose approximately 1.4 percent of GDP in 
revenues each year (line 4.8), more than the average fiscal deficit during the 11 
years of Convertibility. Note however that this reform was almost eliminating the 
off-balance sheet debt of the social security system (Rofman et al., 1997).  
5.  Even considering the increase in entitlement expenditures, the primary 
expenditures of the federal government decreased from 15.2 percent of GDP in 
1991 to 12.4 percent of GDP in 2000.  
 
                                                 
4 At the price of an increase in the average cost, as the yield curves of Emerging Markets Countries (EMC) 
were typically very steep throughout the 90’s. See Cruces et al., 2002. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 e
1. Real Sector
1.1. GDP (in U$S million, period average) 177.000 210.900 236.505 257.440 258.032 272.150 292.859 298.948 283.523 284.204 268.638 94.866
1.2. Real GDP growth 10,5% 10,3% 6,3% 5,8% -2,8% 5,5% 8,1% 3,9% -3,4% -0,8% -4,5% -10,9
1.3 Investment (as % of GDP) 14,2% 17,8% 19,7% 20,0% 18,5% 19,6% 20,9% 21,0% 17,9% 17,5% 15,7% 11,2
1.4 Unemployment rate (in %, May) 8,6 6,9 6,9 9,9 10,8 18,4 17,1 16,1 13,2 14,5 15,4 16,4 17,8
2. Prices
2.1. Inflation (CPI, eop) 1344,0% 84,1% 17,5% 7,4% 3,9% 1,6% 0,1% 0,3% 0,7% -1,8% -0,7% -1,5% 41,0%
2.2. Terms of trade index (1993=100) 89,8 92,5 97,2 100,0 101,5 101,8 109,8 108,4 102,5 96,4 106,1 105,6 103,7
2.3. Nominal exchange rate (HC/US$, of. rate, eop) 0,56 1,00 0,99 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 3,60
2.4. Real exchange rate with USA (period average,ene 1993=1) 1,92 1,13 1,04 0,97 0,96 0,95 0,98 1,00 1,00 1,04 1,08 1,13 2,8
2.5. Multilateral RER (period avg., jan-93=1) 1,35 0,99 1,01 0,99 1,05 1,11 1,06 1,05 1,04 0,96 0,97 0,93 1,51
2.6. Misalignment vs. GSDEEMER 7% 40% 23% 17% 9% 7% 6% 4,1% 11,9% 23,4% 26,5% 25,2%
3. External Sector (In million of US Dollars)
3.1. Current Account (% of GDP) -0,4% -2,7% -3,5% -4,4% -2,2% -2,6% -4,2% -4,9% -4,2% -3,1% -1,6% 9,4%
3.2    Exports 12.249 11.999 12.399 13.118 15.839 20.963 23.766 26.430 26.441 23.333 26.410 26.672 25.353
3.2.1.        % of GDP 6,8% 5,9% 5,5% 6,2% 8,1% 8,7% 9,0% 8,8% 8,2% 9,3% 9,9% 26,7%
3.2.2.       of which to Brazil 1.423 1.486 1.671 2.814 3.656 5.511 6.620 8.107 7.924 5.690 6.991 6.311 4.754
3.2.3.       of which Primary 3.339 3.301 3.500 3.279 3.740 4.816 5.798 5.704 6.603 5.189 5.428 6.061 5302
3.3.    Imports 4.060 8.183 13.795 15.633 20.162 18.804 22.283 28.554 29.531 24.103 23.852 19.148 8.988
3.3.1.        % Growth 101,6% 68,6% 13,3% 29,0% -6,7% 18,5% 28,1% 3,4% -18,4% -1,0% -19,7% -53,1%
3.3.2.        % of GDP 4,6% 6,5% 6,6% 7,8% 7,3% 8,2% 9,7% 9,9% 8,5% 8,4% 7,1% 9,5%
3.3.3.        of which Consumer goods 330 1.514 3.205 3.527 3.907 3.174 3.583 4.536 4.834 4.501 4.609 3.995 1.137
3.4 Trade Balance (% of GDP) 2,2% -0,7% -1,1% -1,7% 0,8% 0,5% -0,7% -1,0% -0,3% 0,9% 2,8% 17,8%
3.5.    Real Services (net) n/a -2.720 -2.554 -3.323 -3.786 -3.818 -3.582 -4.449 -4.516 -4.156 -4.288 -4.021 -1.503
3.6    Financial Services (net) n/a -2.634 -2.472 -2.995 -3.694 -4.662 -5.496 -6.215 -7.409 -7.433 -7.370 -8.094 -6823
3.7. Capital and Financial Account n/a n/a 9.745 12.892 13.083 7.670 12.094 15.449 18.570 13.409 8.792 -3.789 -9363
3.8. Int. Reserves (U$S, CB+DB, eop) 6.010 8.974 12.496 17.223 17.930 19.888 22.881 31.270 32.012 33.589 33.808 19.744 10.022
3.9. External Debt (% of GDP) 34,7% 29,9% 30,6% 33,4% 38,4% 40,6% 42,7% 47,5% 51,2% 51,5% 52,2% 139,7%
Sources: Ministry of Economics, INDEC, Central Bank of Argentina, J.P. Morgan-Chase, Goldman Sachs and own estimations
Table 1.A. Argentina: Convertibility´s Report Card1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 e
4. Fiscal Sector (all values in million of US Dollars)
4.1. National Tax Collection n/a 25.156 36.528 41.745 44.563 42.187 43.112 48.440 50.056 47.643 49.102 45.403 15.296
4.2. Current Expenditures 29.671 35.788 44.245 47.476 48.438 49.368 55.858 57.031 60.047 60.459 56.785 17.409
4.2.1      Wages n/a 4.954 5.652 7.627 7.642 7.250 7.213 7.554 6.844 7.354 6.899 6.542 2.054
4.2.2      Goods and Services n/a 1.686 2.446 4.084 2.445 2.482 2.473 2.660 2.477 2.878 2.315 2.197 662
4.2.3      Current Transfers to Provinces n/a 9.199 12.620 11.809 12.535 12.429 13.336 15.176 15.833 15.640 15.823 13.917 4.475
4.2.4      Social Securities Benefits n/a 9.233 12.653 12.513 15.241 15.628 15.444 17.199 17.481 17.436 17.431 16.617 5.010
4.2.5      Interest n/a 1.890 2.914 3.150 4.087 4.610 5.747 6.660 8.224 9.656 9.630 10.448 2.064
4.3. Primary Surplus (cash basis) n/a 3.120 4.924 5.645 2.865 2.725 -654 1.471 2.589 3.455 2.864 1.131 685
4.4. Overall Balance (% of GDP) -0,4% 1,4% 1,2% -0,1% -0,5% -1,9% -1,5% -1,4% -1,7% -2,4% -3,0% -1,5%
4.5. Privatization revenues (debt exchange excluded) n/a 2.194 1.787 523 733 1.171 375 306 96 2.579 144 60 4
4.6. Overall Balance, Provinces (cash basis) n/a -1.338 -392 -2.111 -2.653 -3.579 -1.778 -1.172 -1.867 -4.124 -3.313 -6.339 -494
4.7. Total Public Debt (billions) 80 87 97 101 112 122 128 144 130*
   % of GDP 31,2% 33,8% 35,7% 34,5% 37,6% 43,0% 45,0% 53,8% 138,3%
4.7.1.    External National Public Debt (billions) n/a 53 51 54 61 67 74 73 81 82 81 83 85
4.7.2.    Domestic National Public Debt (billions) n/a n/a n/a n/a 19 20 24 28 31 39 47 61 45
4.8. Inflows to Pension Funds (billions) 0,8 2,3 3,8 3,7 4,1 4,4 4,3 4,0
5. Financial Indicators (In US$ millions)
5.1. FDI (stock) n/a 11.524 16.302,8 18.520,3 22.428,1 27.991,0 33.557,0 42.012,7 47.797,1 61.926 72.935 75.989
5.2. Peso Deposits (eop) n/a 8.064 13.665 19.770 20.878 19.699 22.622 29.413 32.130 30.352 34.167 20.283 18.178
5.3. Dollar Deposits (eop) n/a 6.560 10.742 18.093 23.046 23.577 27.179 35.378 40.196 45.003 53.586 47.199 867
5.4. Peso Loans (eop) n/a 18.573 22.302 26.386 27.972 20.335 25.051 27.490 29.258 28.243 26.008 15.938 17.693
5.5. Dollar Loans (eop) n/a 12.367 20.333 25.005 31.531 32.085 41.291 48.252 57.989 59.380 56.060 59.622 3.140
5.6. Pension fund holdings (eop) 2.497 5.326 8.827 11.526 16.787 20.381 20.786
5.7. Interest Rate (U$S, eop, in %) n/a n/a n/a 5,8 6,1 7,4 6,0 6,6 6,7 7,1 9,2 8,6 2,1
5.8. Interest Rate ($, eop, in %) n/a 19,8 25,3 8,7 9,6 9,2 7,6 8,4 8,1 10,3 12,3 7,4 21,6
5.9. EMBI Argentina (bp, eop) n/a 563 1.026 370 1.141 875 494 461 696 544 766 4.404 6.358
5.10. EMBI Global (bp, eop) 1.111 631 831 396 1.039 1.044 537 510 1.155 844 864 799 759
5.11. Merval Index (eop) 317 798 427 582 460 519 649 688 430 550 417 295 155
* Until september
Sources: Ministry of Economics, INDEC, Central Bank of Argentina, J.P. Morgan-Chase, Goldman Sachs and own estimations
Table 1.B. Argentina: Convertibility´s Report Card  8
There were, however, obvious problems at the federal level: 
1.  There was a sharp increase in interest payments (line 4.2.5), due to the deficit 
recorded in the period and the transition from a low-coupon debt that was issued 
after the restructuring of domestic (mainly pensioners that were not paid their 
defined benefits as promised during the 80’s) and external liabilities into market 
issued debt. This effect could and should have been anticipated, and primary 
surpluses should have been higher.  
2.  The numbers presented in Table 1.B are on a cash basis. There were, however, 
substantial off-balance sheet payments during the period  (Mussa, 2002, pp. 21), 
which basically originated in the lack of compliance by the state of multiple laws 
during the 80’s and 90’s. 
3.  After the recession in 1995 the economy began growing fast again, but the fiscal 
policy was procyclical.
5 In particular, no serious effort was made to reduce the 
transfers to provinces (see line 4.2.3), which were automatically linked to the tax 
base. If they had remained at, say, the level of 1994, the federal fiscal deficit 
would have been reduced by US$ 3 billion annually during 1998 and 1999.  
There was indeed a spending spree in the provinces during the 90’s.
6 Although the 
transfers they received from the federal government increased from US$ 15.4 billion in 
1996 to US$ 17.4 billion in 1998, their deficit went from US$ 1.8 billion to US$ 4.1 
billion in the same period (line 4.6). Most importantly, the degree of vertical fiscal 
imbalance grew in the period (see Stein, 1999 on the problems that this brings). Half the 
                                                 
5 This is indeed the case in most Latin American countries (see Braun, 2001). Talvi and Vegh (2000), for 
instance, claim that in countries with highly variable tax rates and political pressures for overspending it 
might indeed be optimal to run procyclical fiscal policies. The argument is that if taxes are not reduced in 
economic booms, spending ministers will waste the extra resources. This line of reasoning certainly 
applied for the period 1991 to 1995, in which as many as 20 distortive taxes were eliminated or reduced, 
but not the period starting in 1995, when taxes were increased.  
6 There behavior was not homogeneous, as there were a lot of provinces that behaved in a responsible way. 
Note that a small part of the increase in provincial spending is due to the transfer of education services to 
the provinces.    9
provinces depended on transfers from the federal government for more than 65 percent of 
their total revenues (Llach, 2002). 
The picture that emerges from is that of a national public sector that, beyond efficiency 
considerations (see Section IV.B) was not a spendthrift, although it should certainly have 
increased its primary surplus once the economy recuperated since 1996. Given this 
situation, the question is: What was the magnitude of the fiscal adjustment needed to 
make the public debt dynamics sustainable? To analyze this I use equation (1), which 
describes the dynamics of the public debt as percentage of GDP (see Buscaglia, 2003, for 
further details):  
t t
f
t
t
e
t d
t
t
t t
t d e b b
g
CR f
b +






+ +
+
+
+
+ +
= − − ) 1 (
) 1 (
) 1 (
) 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
1 1 π
π
                            (1) 
where bt is the public debt as percentage of GDP (the superscripts d and f denote the debt 
issued in domestic and in foreign currency, respectively), the real risk-free interest rate is 
equal to ft , CRt is the country risk -the spread investors demand over otherwise similar 
U.S. Treasuries to account for the likelihood of default-, and g is the real GDP growth 
rate. The percent change in prices is π, while π
e is its expected value, et stands for the real 
exchange rate depreciation in period t (I assume inflation in the U.S. is equal to zero), and 
dt is the primary deficit at period t (as percentage of GDP).  
For a country with an initial debt to GDP of 43 percent (only 3.6 percent in domestic 
currency) as Argentina had at the end of 1999, long-run real GDP growth of 3 percent, an 
interest rate of approximately 7.5 percent (that is  075 . 0 1 ) 1 ( * ) 1 ( = − + + t t CR f ), and an 
expected depreciation of the real exchange rate of 2 percent a year, then a primary surplus 
of 2.6 percent of GDP would have been sufficient to keep the debt constant in terms of 
GDP. At that time, the primary surplus was equal to 1.2 percent of GDP, so an initial 
adjustment of 1.4 percent of GDP was needed. There was ample room to achieve this 
target by slashing inefficient expenditures, but the main parties and most state governors 
opposed this.    10
II.2. The Exchange Rate Debate 
This debate has many aspects. The first one corresponds to the degree of overvaluation of 
the exchange rate during the Convertibility, and the second refers to the convenience of 
adopting fixed exchange rates.   
From the beginning of the Convertibility there were concerns that the exchange rate was 
overvalued. In fact, the average real exchange rate from 1991 to 2001 was 1.1 (setting 
1993=1), half its value during the previous decade, and 30 percent lower than its average 
value since 1972 (see Figure 1 and Table 1.A, line 2.4).  
 
Figure 1. Inflation and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Economics and other sources. 1976: 444%, 1983: 
344%, 1984: 626%, 1985: 385%, 1988: 387%, 1989: 4923%, 1990: 1344% 
 
 
These calculations, however, ignored the significant increase in productivity that took 
place during the first years of the 90’s. For instance, according to models that take into 
account productivity changes like the one calculated by Goldman Sachs (see Ades, 1997), 
the real exchange rate was roughly in equilibrium from 1994 to 1997 (Table 1.A, line 
2.6).
7 Underlying real exchange rate discussions lays the issue of competitiveness in the 
tradable sector of the economy (see Buscaglia and Gasha, 2000). If costs increase for 
producers of nontradables, they are able to translate them to consumers, but producers 
                                                 
7 In addition, as Galiani et al. (2002) point out, note that the Peso did not come into attack until very late in 
the game, and the reserves of the Central Bank increased every year from 1990 to 1999, from US$ 6 
billion to US$ 33.6 billion in that period.  
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that either export or compete with imports cannot do this. If firms in the tradable sector 
are making profits, one can be sure that they are not facing a competitiveness problem. 
To measure earnings in a certain sector can prove very difficult, particularly in emerging 
economies, so we have to deal with some imperfect measure of competitiveness. A very 
useful proxy is given by unit labor costs expressed in U.S. dollars, which accounts for 
changes in productivity. Labor costs constitute more than 60 % of total costs in most 
industries, and their use as a competitiveness measure is widespread. In Figure 2 we can 
see that while Argentine competitiveness measured in this way was low at the beginning 
of the Convertibility compared to historical standards, it increased in the early 90´s along 
with productivity and the reduction in labor taxes.  
 
Figure 2. Unit Labor Costs in U.S. Dollars 
 
Figure 3. Contribution to GDP Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on FIEL and Ministry of Economics 
 
 
Certainly what reduced the competitiveness of firms was not the exchange rate policy, 
but all the red-tape restrictions (linked to the anti-reform political base) that could not be 
dismantled and that, for example, resulted in low scores in the competitiveness rankings 
compiled by the WEF (see Table 2).  
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Year  (# of Countries) >>
1997
(53)
1998
(53)
1999
(59)
2000
(59)
2001
(75)
1997
(52)
1998
(85)
1999
(99)
2000
(90)
2001
(91)
2002 
(102)
United States 3 3 2 1 2 16 17 18 14 16 16
Singapure 1 1 1 2 4 9 7 7 6 4 5
Canada 4 5 5 7 3 5 6 5 5 7 7
United Kingdom 7 4 8 9 12 14 11 13 10 13 10
Switzerland 6 8 6 10 15 11 10 9 11 12 12
Taiwan 8 6 11 11 7 31 29 28 28 27 29
Australia 17 14 12 12 5 8 11 12 13 11 11
Sweden 22 23 19 13 9 3 3 3 3 6 5
Germany 25 24 25 15 17 13 15 14 17 20 18
Israel 24 29 28 19 24 15 19 20 22 16 18
Japan 14 12 14 21 21 21 25 25 23 21 20
France 23 22 23 22 20 20 21 22 21 23 25
Portugal 30 26 27 23 25 19 22 21 23 25 25
Malaysia 9 17 16 25 30 32 29 32 36 36 33
Hungary 46 43 38 26 28 28 33 31 32 31 33
Spain 26 25 26 27 22 24 23 22 20 22 20
Chile 13 18 21 28 27 23 20 19 18 18 17
Korea 21 19 22 29 23 34 43 50 48 42 40
Italy 39 41 35 30 26 30 39 38 39 29 31
Thailand 18 21 30 31 33 39 61 68 60 61 64
Turkey 36 40 44 40 54 38 54 54 50 54 64
China 29 28 32 41 39 41 52 58 63 57 59
Mexico 33 32 31 43 42 47 55 58 59 51 57
Indonesia 15 31 37 44 64 46 80 96 85 88 96
Argentina 37 36 42 45 49 42 61 71 52 57 70
Brazil 48 42 51 46 44 36 46 45 49 46 45
Peru 40 37 36 48 55 n/a 41 40 41 44 45
Colombia 41 47 54 52 65 50 79 72 60 50 57
Russia 53 52 59 55 63 49 76 82 82 79 71
Ecuador n/a n/a 53 59 68 n/a 77 82 74 79 89
(1) This index has qualitative and quantitative components. The sources for the quantitative 
      components are the IMF and the World Bank .
(2) Polls are made to executives and country experts.
Table 2. Competitiveness Indicators
 Competitiveness Ranking 
(WEF)  (1)
Corruption Perceptions
Index (TI) (2)  13
It is true that once there is an overvaluation in place, for whatever reason, a super-fixed 
exchange rate makes the adjustment more difficult (Edwards, 2002). That brings us to the 
monetary policy/exchange rate policy debate.  
During the 90’s, there seemed to be an emerging consensus in the debate on the optimal 
monetary policies for emerging markets that corner solutions, either floating exchange 
rates or super-fixed ones, were optimal (see Edwards, 2002). In academic circles, floating 
exchange rates won “hands down” (in words of Calvo, 1999; see also Rogoff, 1998), and 
the convenience of super-fixed exchange was predicated on the basis of, well, the 
behavior of the Argentine economy during the 90’s. It is not surprising then that the fall 
of Argentina will tilt the debate in favor of floating exchange rates (Edwards, 2002).  
At the same time, however, there is evidence of “fear of floating” among those who claim 
that float (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Several problems make most EMC to restrict the 
variability of exchange rates (see Hernandez and Montiel, 2001), and Argentina had and 
still has all of them, namely: (1) a high pass-through coefficient, which makes the 
volatility of the exchange rate undesirable; (2) the relative backwardness of their 
domestic capital markets, which makes foreign capital important for economic growth 
(i.e., which make domestic residents net debtors), and limits the ability of the government 
to borrow domestically (the “perpetrated sin” –see Buscaglia, 2003-). This forces EMC to 
borrow abroad (in foreign currencies, due to the so-called “original sin”), and the 
resulting liability dollarization reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy (Hausmann, 
2001); (3) interest rates in developed countries are the key determinants of capital flows 
to EMC. The magnitude of these flows is so big compared to most EMC´s GDPs that it is 
useless to try to “lean against the wind” using monetary policy; (4) the degree to which 
the U.S. dollar is still the unit of account in many of these countries; (5) lack of 
credibility; (6) the underdevelopment of financial markets to hedge exchange rate risks; 
and (7) the need in many countries of the inflation tax to finance the government (i.e., the 
existence of fiscal dominance). 
The right question then was and still is not whether Argentina should have floated in 
1997 or later as some argue (e.g., Mussa, 2002), but whether Argentina could have   14
floated. Without the proper changes in the institutional and fiscal environment (fiscal 
dominance and perpetrated sin), this still seems to be a difficult task.  
 
 
III. The Origins of Convertibility 
In this section I want to argue that the Convertibility was not thought simply as a 
monetary or stabilization policy, but was a way to stop a long-standing distributional 
conflict and an interlocked part of a supply-side policy. 
In the five decades before the 90´s, the country experienced a secular and convulsive 
decline, that was interrupted every now and then by short-lived stabilization episodes, but 
that accelerated from the 70´s on. In some sense, the experience of the country was the 
perfect example for the dynamics of deterioration depicted by Krueger (1993). During 
this period the economy was characterized by: 
-  Widespread protectionism, following the import substitution (see Edwards, 1995). 
Exports increased at approximately half the rate of growth of world exports in the 
postwar era (Llach, 1997). 
-  Massive intervention of the state in the economy (along with a deterioration of the 
civil service). 
-  High and variable inflation, basically due to the incapacity to restrict expenditures 
and establish an efficient tax system, and wild real exchange rate fluctuations 
(Figure 1), which distorted even more the allocation of resources. 
-  Decline in productivity, which fell from 1947 to 1990 at an annual average rate of 
0.1 percent (see Llach, 1997).  
-  Increase in poverty (Figure 3). In 1974 only 5.1 percent of the population was 
below the poverty line, reaching 42.1 percent in 1989 (Llach, 1997).  
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Figure 3. Poverty and Unemployment in the Great Buenos Aires 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Indec 
 
After decades in which neither civil nor military governments were able to change this 
status quo, the hyperinflation at the end of the 80´s opened the scope of reform (see 
Sturzenegger and Tommasi, 1998, and Tommasi, 2002 for a discussion on why reforms 
sometimes take so long to be launched, and the role of big crises in this process).  
The Convertibility was introduced in 1991 as one key aspect of a comprehensive set of 
reforms that aimed to change drastically the economic environment. A currency board 
was adopted because dollarization was extended after hyperinflation and there was no 
credibility to run an independent monetary policy (Llach, 1997). But, even more 
importantly, it was viewed as a way to end the distributional conflicts that had led to high 
inflation in the past (see Heymann and Leijfonhufvud, 1995), and instead direct all 
political efforts to recreate the basic institutions of a market economy, which were 
destroyed by then, and to modernize the productive capacity of the economy.  
From the very beginning the fixed exchange rate was interlocked with a number of 
reforms. The lack of discipline in the past and hence the lack of credibility mandated a 
type of “burning the ships” approach, by which investors would be reassured that the 
authorities would foster a supply-side revolution that would eliminate most long standing 
inefficiencies in the economy.
8 
 
                                                 
8 Rodrick (1994) argues that policymakers sometimes are required to introduce more reforms than 
necessary in a full credibility world in order to build credibility about their intentions.    16
IV. Needed: More than a “Handful of Heroes” 
President Menem’s government adopted an impressive set of reforms, which included 
among others deregulation, privatizations, opening of the economy, tax cuts and 
expenditure reductions. Table 3 shows the Reform Indices compiled by Lora (2001). 
These indices try to measure the progress of reforms in areas such as trade and financial 
liberalization, tax reform, privatizations and labor market reforms in an index that goes 
from zero (no reform) to one. That is, they concentrate on the so-called first-generation 
reforms (see Williamson and Haggard, 1994). We can observe that Argentina started its 
reforms later than the rest of the region, but that already at the beginning of the 90s it was 
ahead of its peers. The reforms were especially deep in the trade and financial areas, and 
privatizations were fast, but there was slow progress in the tax area, and even a reversal 
in labor market regulations (more on this below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1998 1999
Structutural Reforms Index 0,338 0,366 0,468 0,551 0,574 0,602 0,598 0,604 0,616
  Trade Index 0,669 0,487 0,787 0,839 0,857 0,893 0,871 0,853 0,850
  Financial Index 0,187 0,531 0,586 0,929 0,949 0,947 0,958 0,986 0,986
  Tax Index 0,242 0,272 0,369 0,343 0,305 0,338 0,341 0,304 0,309
  Privatization Index 0,000 0,000 0,061 0,072 0,190 0,277 0,268 0,330 0,394
  Labor Index 0,591 0,538 0,538 0,571 0,571 0,553 0,553 0,547 0,541
Structutural Reforms Index (Latin 
American Regional Average) 0,341 0,399 0,436 0,455 0,484 0,503 0,522 0,573 0,583
Source: Lora, 2001. The index goes from 0 (no reform) to 1.
Table 3. Argentina: Reform Indices  18
The results of these reforms were astounding: stability, high investment and growth, and 
reduction of poverty (Llach, 1997). The average rate of growth of GDP from 1991 to 
1994 was 8.2 percent, while annual inflation was reduced from 84.1 percent to 3.4 
percent in the same period (Table 1.A, lines 1.2 and 2.1). Contradicting the fears of many 
that deemed the exchange rate overvalued, exports increased by 32 percent (Table 1.A, 
line 3.2), and while unemployment was increasing due to massive layoffs in the public 
sector and in the newly privatized public utilities, employment was also increasing. The 
number of people living below the poverty line in the Buenos Aires area, for instance, 
almost halved (Figure 3). The increase in portfolio flows worried many analysts, but the 
country seemed to be using the external financing for a healthy reconstruction of its 
infrastructure (see Table 1.A, lines 1.3. and 5.1).
9 Before the establishment of the 
currency board, deposits were lower than 5 percent of GDP, but amidst stability they 
tripled in four years, and credit re-emerged (see Table 1.A, lines 5.2 to 5.5).  
The Mexican crisis implied a big shock to the economy, and GDP fell 2.8 percent in 
1995. The government, however, showed commitment and decision, and the economy 
started to recover in a few months. This allowed the Convertibility to be strengthened, 
and Menem was re-elected by a landslide. 
 
IV.A. The Identity of Reformers 
Rodrick (1993) argued “it is ironic that these reforms were instituted under a Peronist 
president, Carlos Menem, since Peronism has been virtually synonymous with populism 
and protectionism. Within a year, Argentine reforms had already gone further than those 
adopted over a period of decades in the outward-oriented East-Asian countries”.  
In this paper, I want to argue that precisely the identity of the reformers (and their 
successors) lies at the heart of the argentine crisis. In several Emerging Market Countries 
(EMC), reforms were initiated not by free-marketers but by unlikely characters such as 
                                                 
9 Telephone lines, for instance, increased 44 % in this period. Most of the increase in imports was due to 
the increase in imports of capital goods, parts, and intermediate goods (Table 1.A), and investment and 
productivity were increasing fast.    19
former populists and leftists (Williamson and Haggard, 1994), and Argentina was no 
exception. This has been rationalized in several ways by the literature on the political 
economy of reform (Rodrik, 1993). According to Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), for 
instance, since voters are not fully informed about the way in which policies map into 
outcomes, the identity of those proposing a policy conveys valuable information to the 
population on the necessity to implement some reforms. The public, for instance, will be 
more receptive of a call for adjustment measures if they come from a populist than if they 
come from a conservative (with an analogous effect as the one Nixon going to China had 
on American foreign policy). 
But neither the Peronist nor the Radical party (the main opposition party by then and the 
one that succeeded Menem in 1999) changed during the reform process, and most of their 
ranks remained convinced of the old protectionist and state-intervention policies. It is 
important to remark two aspects of Argentina´s politics: first, the main parties in 
Argentina spanned the whole political spectrum, including reformists and anti-reformists; 
secondly, not only Senators, but also Deputies are elected in provincial districts. The 
second feature induces parties to select a well-known figure for the first place in the list 
of candidates, and to “hide” the party bosses in lower places. While the reformists took 
the seat in the executive branch (Menem and later De la Rúa), that was not true in 
Congress in many provinces. The gridlock created in the governance of the political 
parties also prevented any renovation, and so – amazingly – those opposing reforms 
received the lion share of recognition among voters in the succeeding legislative 
elections.  
Most importantly, the implicit alliance between the Peronists and the political center, 
which provided ideological support and the technocrats, avoided the emergence of a 
strong pro-business political party during the initial years of the Convertibility, capable of 
catalyzing the support that the success of the program achieved, and of pushing Argentina 
from a rent-seeking capitalism to a true enterprise society. In Table 4 I present the 
partisan composition of both chambers of Congress throughout this period. It can be seen 
that the Peronist party remained in control of both chambers in Congress and of most 
provincial governments throughout the period.  Panel A. Partisan Composition of the Chamber of Deputies (in %),1987-1999
1987-89 1989-91 1991-93 1993-95 1995-97 1997-99
Peronist Party (PJ) 73 50 50 50 52 47
Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) 46 37 33 33 27 26
Center-Right Provincial Parties 6 7 9 9 8 11
Other 5 6 5 8 12 16
Panel B. Partisan Composition of the Senate (in %), 1986-1998
1986-89 1989-92 1992-95 1995-98
Peronist Party (PJ) 47 54 62 56
Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) 39 30 23 29
Center-Right Provincial Parties 15 15 15 14
Frepaso 1
Panel C. Partisan Composition of Provincial Governorships (in %), 1987-1999
1987-91 1991-95 1995-99
Peronist Party (PJ) 77 61 61
Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) 9 17 22
Center-Right Provincial Parties 14 22 17
Other
Source: Bambaci et al., 2002
Table  4. Partisan Composition during Menem´s Administration  21
Even though Argentina had its “handful of heroes” (in words of Harberger, 1993), the 
lack of a pro-reform coalition imposed a lot of restrictions on the reform process (see 
Bambaci et al., 2002), and later tried to override these reforms and go back to the old 
days.  
 
IV.B. The Limits of Reforms 
The constituency of this pro-reform coalition allowed the implementation of many of the 
so-called first generation reforms, but imposed many restrictions and limits on the reform 
agenda (see Bambaci et al., 2002, and Lora, 2001). First of all, they maintained several 
“illiberal enclaves”, such as the labor market regulations, patronizing social policies and 
the federal fiscal system.
10 Second, many of these reforms were implemented with 
corruption and inefficiency (see Tommasi, 2002), which reduced the attractiveness of 
reforms in the eyes of the public. Finally, they allowed changes in lower and some 
intermediate level rules, but deeper politico-institutional rules and practices were left 
untouched (see Tommasi, 2002). 
That is, old habits die hard, and by 1996 the limits of reform were starting to emerge. The 
remaining reforms touched the limits of ideology and the nerve of the status quo, and 
were left beyond the reach of the reformist technocrats. Some reforms implied substantial 
changes in the way the state at its different levels operated to provide its services, which 
were highly inefficient on various accounts. Although the level of public expenditures is 
a matter of debate, corruption and inefficiencies were hampering its efficiency without 
doubt, and this basically reflected the clientelistic way in which the main parties used to 
do politics (more on this below). Also needed were further trade liberalization, fiscal 
discipline in the provinces, the abolition of distortionary taxes and red-tape restrictions 
that hindered the emergence of a new breed of entrepreneurs, to name a few.  
On the contrary, from the mid 90´s the re-election objective dominated the agenda, and 
reforms came to a halt. As fiscal deficits increased and the main political parties and 
                                                 
10 The main point of Bambaci et al. (2002) is that the fundamental reforms executed were politically viable 
thanks to the maintenance of these “illiberal enclaves”.    22
lobbies were reluctant to support “efficient” expenditure cuts, reformist technocrats 
started imposing increasingly inefficient new taxes and draconian cuts on public 
expenditures, with the approval of the IMF.  
These dynamics should not be underestimated. An insight from the literature on the 
political-economy of reform is that people have limited information about the way in 
which alternative policies map into economic outcomes (see Harberger, 1993). One can 
easily assume that in Latin America “...there have been roughly two models of the world: 
one in which extensive state intervention is the best policy, and one in which focused 
(and minimal) state intervention is the best policy” (Sturzenegger and Tommasi, 1998). 
People change their perceptions of the world very sluggishly: they observe economic 
outcomes, but it is not easy for them to discern between bad policies and bad luck. The 
mounting evidence of state corruption and inefficiency, coupled with rising 
unemployment (see Table 1.A, line 1.4 and Table 2) and repeated adjustment policies has 
surely shaken the support for reform policies, the IMF, and the reformist technocrats.  
Increasingly, those politicians from the main parties that countered the reforms started to 
attack the “model” (of minimal state intervention), proposing to revert back to the old 
days. In addition, and as it is usually the case when the beneficial effects of a policy are 
widespread and the harmful ones more concentrated, pressure groups that countered 
reforms (unions, the old-economy industrial sector, some provinces, etc.) were more 
organized and influential than those representing the beneficiaries of the new 
environment.  
 
IV.C. The Sacred Cows of Populism 
Although budget problems after the hyperinflation and the new consensus that was 
emerging at the beginning of the 90’s (Edwards, 1995) allowed the sacrifice of many 
former “sacred cows” of populism, namely the privatization of state companies, several 
key areas were left outside the scope of reform. According to Tommasi (2002) the 
political instrumentation of the reforms could be described as a ‘vote-buying’ strategy, in 
which pivotal players such as labor unions, several provinces, and some business groups   23
received substantial benefits and exemptions through the reform process (see also 
Bambaci et al., 2002).  
The first area left out was the tax sharing agreement between the Federal Government 
and the provinces, whose importance in the crisis I have analyzed in Section II. The 
reform process was also much slower in the provinces in general, even with regards to 
first-generation reforms.  
The second area included the distortions of the labor market. These can be classified in 
three categories (Edwards, 1995): (a) high costs of dismissal, (b) high payroll taxes,
11 and 
(c) the nature of labor-management relations. This combination resulted in an increase in 
unemployment and in the black-market economy. The implications of this cannot be 
underestimated. Almost half the workers in Argentina were in the informal economy 
during the 90´s, thus staying far from health insurance, institutionalized credit, and so 
forth. The consequences do not stop there. The low compliance with payroll taxes 
undermined the transition to a fully-funded social security system and lowered the 
savings ratio. These distortions, along with a convoluted tax system, induced many small 
and medium firms to stay in the black economy, and hence out of institutionalized credit 
markets.  
Perhaps the social policy area was the one that resisted more the impetus of reform. It 
was kept under the control of the populist-prone party bosses, which used its funds for 
electoral and personal purposes. While problems here were (are) generalized, some 
examples may be illustrative: 
-  At the PAMI, the federal Medicare-type program for the retired under the old pay-
as-you go system, 22.5 percent of its beneficiaries had less than 14 years of age, 
and multi-millionaire frauds were discovered every now and then. The same 
applied to the union-run health care organizations. 
                                                 
11 Although payroll taxes started to be eliminated during these years, they remained high. Moreover, in 
some cases workers pay for services of very bad quality, such as mandatory union-provided health 
insurance.  
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-  At the provincial level, the situation was no better. In the province of Buenos 
Aires, for instance, social policy was based on “manzaneras”, women that alerted 
the government of the needs in their respective blocks.  The accountability of 
these programs was very low and suspicions of their political use were 
widespread.  
Finally, there was increasingly mounting evidence of the self-serving attitude of 
politicians at all levels (federal, provincial and municipal). The perception of corruption 
was high and increasing fast over time, as Table 2 shows. Beyond the un-measurable but 
extended suspicions of bribes in the allocation of contracts, there was widespread 
evidence about the high cost of the elective bodies and political appointees throughout 
the country. Grupo Sophia, an independent think tank, estimated that these costs 
amounted to US$ 5.4 billion annually (Grupo Sophia, 2001), including US$ 3.5 billion at 
the provincial level. Formosa, for instance, a province of only 504.000 inhabitants and a 
per-capita GDP several times lower the national mean, had a Congress with a budget of 
US$ 57 million in the year 2000 (around 5% of its GDP).  
What appears from this picture is a growing dissatisfaction with a political system that 
behaved in a self-serving manner, and that was at the same time increasing taxes or 
asking for budgetary restrictions in key areas as education. Not surprisingly, tax evasion 
increased throughout the period. In addition, the mismanagement of the social budget and 
the deceleration of growth in 1998 were starting to have an impact on the poor (Figure 3). 
 
IV.D. A Rent-Seeking Capitalism 
Although privatization and deregulation had transformed the corporate landscape in 
Argentina, much needed to be done to transform it from a rent-seeking capitalism to a full 
market economy.  
The growing number of exceptions in the tax code and in tariff lines (see Section IV.E) 
showed that there was ample room for lobbying. In addition, much of the investment 
growth was in areas in which the government had granted monopoly or near-monopoly   25
powers, such as telephones, airports, and highways.
12 Although some privatizations were 
treated as models in other countries, some were highly criticized (as the national airline), 
and the anti-reform camp extended its criticism to all privatizations.  
Moreover, red-tape restrictions to investment remained high. To initiate a new venture, 
for instance, 71 days and 12 steps were required on average in Argentina, compared to 
only 7 days and four steps in the U.S. Not surprisingly, the small business sector 
remained sclerotic in the 90’s. On top of the tax problems that pushed many small firms 
into the black economy, the upgrade in the regulation of the domestic capital markets was 
not enough to improve their access to new equity capital.
13 
 
IV.E. Bad Luck 
As in any tragedy, bad luck also had a role in the Argentine crisis. Bad luck came in three 
different forms: external shocks, the New Washington Consensus, and President De la 
Rúa´s lack of leadership. However, paraphrasing the CEO of a big U.S. corporation that 
once said: “I work very hard to be lucky”, one could easily argue that in some cases 
Argentina “worked hard to get unlucky”. 
 
- External Shocks 
Consider the external shocks first. They were very big and protracted: after a few years of 
tranquility following the Mexican currency crisis of 1994, starting in 1997 one big 
currency crisis after the other hit the emerging debt markets each year (East Asia, Russia 
and Brazil). Figure 4 shows that each of these subsequent shocks increased the spread on 
Argentina’s sovereign debt, and although once each crisis was solved it reverted, the 
floor was higher every time. This implied that access to the markets got harder and the 
                                                 
12 Bambaci et al.(2002) argue that the government fostered the participation of big local business groups in 
the privatization process to neutralize their reaction, as many of them were former state suppliers.   
13 FDI, on the contrary, increased from US$ 11.5 billion in 1991 to US$ 72.9 billion in 2000 (Table 1.B, 
line 5.1). This process of increased foreign ownership was also subject to the attack of the anti-reform 
camp.     26
cost of servicing the debt increased (see Table 1.B, line 4.2.5). The average country 
spread in 1999 was 710 basis points, 356 basis points higher than the pre-Asian spreads. 
Given that the federal public sector borrowing requirements amounted to approximately 
US$ 15 billion, this implied an extra outlay of US$ 550 million per year.
14 But Argentina 
got itself into trouble, in part due to the high public sector borrowing requirements (see 
Section II), and in part due to the lack of development of the domestic capital markets. 
Note in Table 1.B (lines 4.7.1 and 4.7.2) that since 1998 most if not all the new sovereign 
debt was demanded by domestic individuals and institutions, namely by the newly 
created pension funds (AFJP) and mutual funds  (see Ades and Buscaglia, 1999, for a 
detailed analysis, and the evolution of the pension fund’s assets in Table 1.B). But given 
the lack of credibility, all these bonds were denominated in hard currencies, and issued 
abroad (even though locals demanded them).
15 This added a lot of confusion to the 
debate, as the anti-reform camp called all the new debt “external debt”, and supported the 
sovereign default as if it would have no impact on the domestic resident’s portfolios.   
Figure 4. J.P. Morgan’s EMBI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Ministry of Economics 
                                                 
14 Not all the increase in spreads is attributable to external reasons. During the 1999 electoral campaign, for 
example, Peronist presidential candidate Duhalde declared that he may not pay the debt if elected, and 
spreads increased by 150 basis points. 
15 Buscaglia (2003) has called this problem “perpetrated sin”, as opposed to the so called “original sin”, that 
refers to the inability of most small countries (such as Argentina and New Zealand) to issue debt in their 
own currencies in international markets. The “perpetrated sin” refers to the underdevelopment of local 
debt markets due to the lack of stability, institutions and credibility of some countries (such as Argentina, 
but no New Zealand). 
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On top of this, the terms of trade decreased by 12 percent from 1996 to 1999 (Table 1.A, 
line 2.2). But by far the biggest blow to the psyche of the reform process was Brazil’s 
devaluation at the beginning of 1999. It had an impact on three fronts: exports, location, 
as many industrial firms started to move to Brazil, and –most importantly- on the 
policymaking debate, as it provided “evidence” in favor of the devaluation.  
But one can argue that Argentina got itself into trouble. The Mercosur had an appeal to 
the main political parties because it was seen as an alternative to the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas proposed by the U.S.,
16 and to the industrial lobby since it allowed for 
multiple exceptions. Mercosur´s original idea of “open regionalism” soon degenerated, 
and there was evidence of ample trade diversion within the arrangement (see Yeats, 
1998). By 1998 Argentina was sending almost 30% of its exports to Brazil –see Table 
1.A, line 3.2.2. -. No macroeconomic convergence criteria were established, and hence 
Argentina subjected itself to a big and foreseeable shock coming from Brazil’s fiscal 
imbalances. After the devaluation of the Real, exports to Brazil fell 29%, a shock that 
amounted to almost 1% of GDP, while the multilateral real exchange rate dropped by 
18% (Table 1.A, line 2.5). 
Ideological and vested-interest reasons impeded Argentina to open more to international 
markets, and hence increase and diversify its export base. Although progress in this front 
was impressive at first, by 1999 exports amounted to only 8.2 percent of GDP, still one of 
the lowest ratios in the world.   
 
- De la Rúa´s Lack of Leadership  
When President De la Rúa took office, there were several signs of strains on the system, 
and many claimed that there were debt sustainability problems.
17  
The literature on the political economy of reform has dealt on the issue of what makes a 
reform process sustainable. According to Edwards (1995, pp. 303) “…the consolidation 
                                                 
16 The same applies to the Brazilian side.  
17 For an opposite view, see Ades and Buscaglia, 1999.   28
of the reform process requires the population at large –or at least a majority- to recognize 
that the modernization effort will generate, sooner rather than later, sustainable and solid 
results in the form of rapid growth and improved social conditions. Consolidation also 
requires the creation of new institutions that …shield the economy from the short-run 
effects of the political cycle.” Undoubtedly, the setback in the reform process since 1996, 
the extended corruption in the political system, and the external shocks received 
deteriorated the sustainability basis of the reform process in Argentina. 
In spite of this there was some room to be optimistic, given that De la Rúa got elected 
precisely because he opposed populist policies advocated by his Peronist adversary, Mr. 
Duhalde, and he promised to correct the “corruption” problems. During De la Rúa’s term, 
however, it became apparent that coalitions supporting the right policies needed to be 
built to run a successful government (see Williamson, 1994), and that having just a 
“handful of heroes” (in words of Harberger) was not enough.  
The coalitional composition of the main parties in Argentina played a role in what 
followed. Although De la Rúa was in favor of the reforms of the 90´s, most members of 
his alliance (the Radical party and the leftist Frepaso) strongly opposed them. The 
Radical party bosses imposed Mr. Machinea, who had been president of the Central Bank 
right before Alfonsín’s hyperinflation, as Economy Minister. Instead of issuing measures 
that would assure the new government’s commitment to market-friendly policies, Mr. 
Machinea prepared an income tax increase that allegedly evaporated part of the new 
administration’s political capital and aborted an incipient recovery. In less than a 100 
days, the positive image of De la Rúa plunged (Figure 5), along with consumer 
confidence.  
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Figure 5. Positive Image of President De la Rua (Gallup) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : La Nación, various issues 
 
 
Source : La Nación, various issues 
 
Note the contrast with Chile after Pinochet. By the time of the political transition, the 
reform camp was well represented by a coalition of political parties and the benefits of 
reforms were widespread among the population, so the incoming leftist coalition had no 
option but to continue along the same policy lines. To show his commitment, President 
Aylwin’s first measures included a reduction of tariffs and budget austerity measures. In 
addition, measures to strengthen the independence of the Central Bank were taken shortly 
before by the outgoing military regime, with the support of the incoming administration 
(Haggard and Webb, 1993). 
In Argentina, the row over the appropriate set of policies continued inside and outside the 
cabinet, particularly with respect to whether adjustment policies are expansionary or not. 
The anti-reform camp, that prevailed in the ruling coalition, wanted to run standard 
Keynesian expansionary policies, helped in the debate by some prominent U.S. 
academicians.
18 Among developed countries, Perotti (1999) has found that there is 
considerable support in the data for the notion that initial conditions, namely the initial 
                                                 
18 Calvo et al. (2002) argue that once the fiscal imbalance became apparent and a stock adjustment was 
necessary, its implementation triggered a “war of attrition”. Nobody wanted to adopt these unpopular 
fiscal cuts, and so decisions were delayed (see Sturzenegger and Tommasi, 1998). Note that those who 
opposed the measures most were the anti-reformists of both main parties, and more so the ones belonging 
to the ruling coalition.  
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level of the debt or the previous rate of debt accumulation, are an important determinant 
of the effects of fiscal cuts. In EMC there are even more compelling reasons to believe 
that this is the case, as domestic debt markets are shallow and sovereign debts are 
denominated in foreign currencies (see Buscaglia, 2003, for further analysis). If debt 
dynamics become unsustainable to the eyes of investors, country risk rises and capital 
flows come to a sudden stop (see Cruces et al., 2002). In fact, the correlation between 
private capital flows and GDP growth in the Argentine economy was 80 percent in the 
period 1992-2002 (Figure 6). Again, the lack of progress in the reform process can be 
considered as responsible of these policy dynamics, as the economy remained very 
exposed to capital flows.  
 
Figure 6. GDP Growth and Private Capital Flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : Ministry of Economics, and own capculations 
 
In spite of the high approval rates with which he got into office De la Rúa was unable to 
build a coalition around the policies he supported, and by then both the ruling coalition 
and the Peronist opposition were broken along ideological lines. The political system left 
very narrow opportunities of reform, and hence the measures proposed were highly 
unpopular among the people, the markets, or both. On top of this, several mistakes were 
made by Cavallo during his last tenure, and his prestige decreased as fast as deposits in 
the financial system (see also Table 1.B, lines 5.2 and 5.3). 
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- The New Washington Consensus 
By this time in the game, a New Washington Consensus had emerged, and central to its 
credo were the recommendation of floating exchange rates for all countries and “private 
sector involvement”, a keyword for allowing if not fostering sovereign defaults (see 
Calomiris, 2001, and  Meltzer, 2002).
19 Although big financial packages were extended 
to Argentina during 2000 and 2001 (Mussa, 2002), private investors learned that the 
stance of the official institutions had changed with respect to bailouts, and retreated from 
many emerging markets.
20  
IV.F. Epilogue : An Institutional Coup 
The anti-reform camp was well aware of the Bayesian dynamics. After all, at least twice 
in the past reformist attempts were reversed after balance of payments crises (after 
Minister Krieger Vassena in the late 60’s and after Minister Martinez the Hoz in the late 
70’s).  
The growing dissatisfaction with the political parties led more than 40 percent of the 
voters to abstain or to nullify their votes in the legislative elections held in October of 
2001. Among those who cast positive votes, the anti-reform camp won hands over. 
Former president Alfonsín and the former governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Mr. 
Duhalde, were elected senators. They quickly and mistakenly interpreted the election 
results as a vote against the model (of minimal state intervention). 
At the beginning of December 2001, Radical party bosses began discussing how to 
abandon the “corset” of Convertibility without any government member included in the 
talks (La Nación, December 18, 2001), and rumors circulated that Alfonsín and Duhalde 
were having talks about how to conduct government after De la Rúa. Shortly after, 
organized riots in the Province of Buenos Aires, the stronghold of Mr. Duhalde, put an 
end to De la Rúa’s government. 
                                                 
19 In my view, Rodrick (2002) mistakenly leaves “private sector involvement” out of the list of articles of 
faith of the New Washington Consensus. 
20 The no-bailout policy was inherently destabilizing and hence short-lived, as the recent packages to Brazil 
and Uruguay showed.   32
After a series of short-lived attempts Mr. Duhalde assumed the presidency, mainly with 
the support of the Radical party and some members of the Peronist party from the 
province of Buenos Aires (La Nación, February 1, 2002). Default, devaluation, and 
asymmetric pesofication of contracts followed, and the economy went on a tailspin (see 
Table 1.A, line 1.2). Since then, the executive and legislative powers have tried to 
undo most of the reforms established in the 90’s, including the independence of the 
central bank, and the fully-funded social security system, and only in some cases were 
stopped by international pressure and the menace of hyperinflation. Mr. Duhalde’s first 
statements were that “this model destroyed everything” (La Nación, January 1, 2002), 
and since then the government has repeatedly blamed the “model” (of minimal state 
intervention) for the ills that the population was suffering.  
This account of the crisis shows that what was under dispute was not a monetary system, 
but a complete set of reforms that were introduced by a populist government with the 
help a group of competent technocrats, but that failed to gain the necessary support to be 
sustainable. The coalitional nature of the main parties and the candidate selection system 
made anti-reformist groups to gain political power during the initial (and successful) 
years after the first-generation reforms were implemented. Once the economy 
decelerated, they tried to undo the reforms to provide voters a signal of the “right” model 
of the world.  
V. Policy Lessons 
Note that the alternative explanations of the crisis are not innocuous to the analysis of the 
policies that the international organizations recommended Argentina in the past, or to the 
ones it is now proposing. If the problem was a fixed and overvalued exchange rate, as 
many still claim, then the solution was to devalue and float, and we already know the 
consequences. As for the IMF officials the main problem was the excessive fiscal deficit, 
then they settled for any draconian and unpopular new taxes enacted to reduce it.  
On the contrary, a political economy approach would have made the IMF ask Argentina 
long ago to adopt a sensible tax sharing agreement between the federal government and 
the provinces, to deregulate the labor market, and to reduce its dependency on Brazil 
through more aggressive trade pacts with other regions (or even by unilaterally reducing   33
its tariffs as Chile), to name a few. There are obvious limits to the pressure that 
multilateral organizations can exert on the set of policies adopted by a country, but 
conditionality on the actual (and not promised) adoption of these policies would have 
probably averted the crisis, as the benefits of reform expanded to all sectors.  
In addition, although the reduction of the deficit was necessary, political economy 
considerations (and purely economic ones, as claimed in Section IV.E) would have 
alerted the IMF against the acceptance of any measure to achieve that goal. 
The implications for future recommendations are also very important. Now that the 
super-fixed exchange arrangement of Argentina has failed, most economists and 
bureaucrats at Washington are recommending the adoption of inflation targeting regimes 
across the board.
21 We should not wait for the next crisis to realize that they will be a 
permanent feature of those EMC that are not capable of forming solid coalitions to 
reform their institutions and support the transition from a rent-seeking capitalism to 
market economies, regardless of their exchange rate policies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Not so long ago, some influential economists were predicting that currency boards would be adopted by 
the major Latin American countries, like Hausmann (La Nación, April 6, 2001).   34
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